The Rise of the New South Governmentality: Competing Southern Revitalization Projects and Police Responses to the Black Civil Rights Movement 1961–1965

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Abstract This article examines the southern response to the civil rights movement and its relationship to the broader struggle for southern influence and control. Drawing from governmentality studies and the concept of "security", I trace the correlation of two competing southern revitalization projects with distinct southern policing styles to consider the importance of normative political cultures, rather than the instrumental and immediate political outcomes of each local movement, on the southern response to the civil rights movement. Despite the development of new south police practices that curtained civil rights protest and produced a politically modern and racially tolerant idealized new south image, the old south project, in its failures, gained influence on the county, statewide, and regional levels. Although the conflicting revitalization projects differed in their objectives, the linkages between them set the stage for subsequent southern revitalization and development that started in the 1970s.

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The black civil rights movement was the first post-war American social movement to challenge the ideas and viability of a homogenous national political culture, identity and citizenship. Their challenge also changed how states' governed and policed social movements. Specifically for the south, a new south governmentality arose in relation to the civil rights movement and the broader process of southern revitalization. Instead of using violent practices aimed at suppressing social movements and pinning blacks and poor whites to the margins of society, a new form of governing and policing arose that created and allowed for an "acceptable" level of racial integration so as not to jeopardize the flows of Federal and Northern capital into the South. Drawing from governmentality studies, I trace the correlation of two competing southern revitalization projects with distinct southern policing styles to consider the importance of normative political cultures, rather than the instrumental and immediate political outcomes of each movement, on the southern response to the civil rights movement.

I use the concept "revitalization project" to refer to the ideas, discourses and narratives that governing officials draw from to

organize political and economic practices in relation to the normative and idealized constructs of how a state, region or local municipality should improve, enhance and make a politically defined territory "better". Normative ideas of the "idealized community" organize political projects and governing practices based on ideas of what a community should look like, in terms of bodies located at the center/periphery, and the types of acceptable civic ethics. The concept of a project captures the notion that political struggles are endless and ever changing, while also conceptualizing their coherent nature, objectives, goals and rationalities that organize political practices in specified territories. It also overcomes reducing governmentalities into a single, unfolding, uniform logic of the state and its role in development (see Stenson and Watt 1999, Ghatak 2008). The post-war south featured two competing southern revitalization projects: the new south and old south projects. The idea behind the new south revitalization project was to produce a cosmopolitan civic image that "modernized" the south, by centralizing political power, embracing a service sector economy and limiting racial tensions. In contrast, the old south revitalization project attempted to strengthen the south's existing, but declining, industrial and agricultural bases with corporate tax cuts and suppressing black and white wage earners, to produce southern autonomy from Northern cultural influence and Federal legislation. This paper analyzes the point at which the two projects differed on issues of policing and security in relation to the treatment of southern blacks in general and civil rights protesters in particular.

In order to understand the emergence of two competing forms of southern governance, and their eventual reconciliation, this paper compares the southern response to the civil rights movement in three well-known cases – Albany, Birmingham, and Selma. Albany represents a case where civic leaders drew from the new south revitalization project protect Albany's new south image by allowing for minimal levels of civil rights demonstrations. Birmingham represents a case where civic leaders drew from the old south revitalization project to establish an idea of southern autonomy by defeating and ending the civil rights movement. Selma represents a case where the city and county drew from competing projects, where the city drew from the new south project to shape a idealized "new" and future Selma, while the county drew from the old south project to expand the old south's influence across the black belt.

The importance of the three cases is that between 1961 and 1965, the civil rights movement engaged in mass protest activities throughout the American South at moment the South was in the

process of cultural, economic and political change. Civil rights scholars have documented how the civil rights movement sought out violent adversaries in southern areas that would produce federal intervention and favorable legislation (see Garrow 1986, Fairclough 1987 McAdam 1996, 1999). While the movement's strategy to discipline their supporters to exhibit nonviolent civic practices was consistent throughout these years, they did not enjoy the "success" or expected outcomes in every demonstration. Questions remain as to why the some southern areas continued to respond to the civil rights movement with violence while others did not. Why, despite the existence of previous policing models and federal advisement on how to stop the civil rights movement, did the Birmingham police in 1963 and parts of Dallas County and the Alabama state police in 1965 reject this advice, and continue to use violence and physical force to police black protest? As I show below, despite the new south project's success at achieving their desired political outcomes of stopping the civil rights movement and the old south project's failures to stop the movement and prevent federal intervention, the old south project continued to spread and gain influence on the regional and state level. This indicates the importance the political projects construction of normative ideals, rather than desired, practical or rational outcomes, that drive and organize state governing practices.

The Governmentality of Southern Revitalization

The idea of governmentality, a question Foucault (2007) originally posed to address state rationalities, focuses on state practices, or the practices of governing and specification of objects (population) and borders (territory). It allows for an understanding of how major shifts and forms of governing practices vary at the local and state level, and how the different forms of governing practices organize political and economic restructuring processes (Burchill, Gordon, Miller 1991, Rose 1999, and Dillon 2007). The governmentality approach differs from the sociological "autonomy of the state" approach that conceptualized the state as an autonomous actor seeking to do what is best for the state, rather than for social groups or classes, and in doing so, structures relationships within civil society (Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979, 1985). The autonomy of the state approach sought to distinguish the state as an independent actor rather than an institution controlled by capitalist economic interests. Although the autonomy of state model avoids reducing state practices to economic concerns, it cannot account for how a multiplicity of political rationalities and projects compete for influence and the right to govern. Nor can they account for the

autonomy and influence that civil society and social movements have over state practices, which questions how autonomous a state can be, as well as the basis for its autonomy, and illustrates how novel forms of governing practices take shape outside of the state (see Alexander 1992, Rose and Miller 1992).

I argue that the governmentality perspective provides a better understanding of southern governing than the existing autonomy of state model on three key dimensions. First, the changing forms of governing change the function of autonomous expertise, rather than the other way around. In this sense, governmentality focuses on the epistemology of governing as opposed to an autonomous state driven by career officials, rational decisions and incentives. The competing cultural-political projects that take root in civil society shape expert and administrative practices, which produce specific styles of governing. Different styles of governing, in turn, produce variations in how the state responds to political threats and challenges. It challenges the idea that a single style of policing translates from the state level to the local level and is applied the same, or with little variation, to every group. Second, the functions of government change in relations to how various populations are defined/coded. States shape governing practices around a population whose bodies, distinguished by race, poverty, and disease, serve as the basis of exclusion. However, as Melucci (1996) showed, social movement's contest theses cultural meanings because these meanings serve to legitimate exclusion. Below, I show that an important part of the new south revitalization project was not just recoding blacks as "nationals" worthy of minimal levels of respect, evidenced by new south police limiting the amount and forms of violence targeted towards blacks, but also restructuring the conduct of state agents. The conduct, responsibility, and ethics of administrators and elected officials, as well as that of the state's citizens, is also the subject of good governing and necessary in order to produce and attach idea of solidarity/stability to a political locale. While new forms of governing arise in light of recoding populations, in the case of southern governments, the conduct of their police and local administrators also became subject to reevaluation in relation to the civil rights nonviolent performances. Third, the procedures states' use to gain and reproduce control over territory creates uneven spatial development (see Harvey 1990). Rather than view development or revitalization in economic and ideological terms, where outcomes are measured in terms of malice and exploitation, this paper focuses on the underlying cultural logic of revitalization for the purposes of establishing new governing regimes and representations of idealized communities.

Policing and Security

The governmentality and state autonomy approaches differ in their analysis and conclusions over how states' police social movements. The state autonomy tradition has found that the state discourages social movements in favor of elites and influences the extent and scope of movement demands (Piven & Cloward 1971, Wisler & Giugni 1996, Amenta & Young 1999, Amenta et al 2005). Donatella della Porta (1995) argued for the importance of situating the police at the institutional level because it explains how the police influence protester behavior, which political opportunities open, and how the police represent the dominant groups' ideology toward oppositional challenges (also see Ellison & Martin 2000). Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003) argued that the police response depends on their perception of "situational threats", where variability in the harshness of police response results from the subjective level of the police. Thus, the consensus work on state-movement relations suggest policing is nation-state based, reflects the dominant groups' ideology, and varies in degree of tolerance according to how the police perceive the threat of a social movement.

Despite noting that the states' police response varies based on perceived threats, research on how states respond to social movements is limited because of the use of the nation-state as the only unit of analysis, useful for comparative nation-state analysis, but not for understanding differences in regional and intra-state policing practice. Nor does it consider how the style of social movement practice shapes the form and representations of state response. Therefore, if police practices are culturally informed, in that they are part of a larger revitalization or political project, then we should expect to find variation in police practice rooted in different projects.

In order to understand how southern policing practices were linked not to dominant state ideologies but to southern governmentalities, I draw from the concept of "security" (Foucault 2007, Rose 2007, also see Hardt & Negri 2004: 63–96). Foucault (2007) locates the idea of security in the emergence of biopolitics, notions of risk, and the modern nation-state. Unlike disciplinary practices, which focus on shaping and limiting individual conduct, security is an element of biopolitics that focuses on the "regularities and irregularities" of a population. Security puts present and future actions into a probable series of events that lets some things happen in order to prevent something more important from happening. The idea of security focuses on the point at which an event, phenomenon, practice, action, resistance etc. can take place and the level

and intensity such a practice is considered desirable and non-threatening to the existing and future social order. Thus, techniques of security develop to manage the population in relation to an existing or prospective normative ideal.

The southern responses to the civil rights movement sought to limit the intensity, escalation, development and spread of the civil rights movement from producing larger symbolic claims for equality. On the one hand, the new south police practice allowed for some "space" for the civil rights demonstrations. New south administrators designed police techniques in relation to the non-violent style of the civil rights protest by focusing on the internal practices of the police. These internal practices included dressing police officers in standard police uniform, observing meetings, and using generic arrest charges of "disorderly conduct" and "marching without a permit" that prevented the civil rights movement from using the arrests in desegregation test cases. They also included negotiating with protesters, arresting with minimal force, limiting violence, and dispersing jailed civil rights protesters in neighboring county jails to prevent communication and solidarity building. Thus, new south police practices allowed the new south idea to take root by permitting an acceptable degree of protest that did not jeopardize Northern and Federal capital, while preventing meaningful civic and racial integration.

On the other hand, the old south revitalization project used police practices that emphasized the idea of "containment". Containment practices included using physical brutality to secure control of a territory by isolating the protest from adjacent areas. This style emphasized the "disciplinary" functions of power that sought to concentrate and enclose a population by preventing the development and spread of protest. Containment practices included dressing police in riot gear (helmets, gas masks) and visibly displaying weapons (e.g. guns, cattle prods, dogs, fire hoses and tanks) to intimidate and frighten blacks and white urban citizens into obedience. Rather than observe black protest as it developed, then intervening, the old south police practices preemptively isolated blacks in shared black social space (i.e. segregated black neighborhoods). Rather than let an acceptable degree of protest develop, containment practices provided specific locations of police-protester confrontation for the media and other protesters to converge. Thus, an important part of the new south revitalization project was organizing a set of policing practices designed to manage the civil rights protests by limiting police violence that represented racial tensions and southern instability. This challenged the old south revitalization project's practice of using violence to produce a sovereign idealized old south.

Competing Southern Revitalization Projects

From the 1930s to the early 1970s, the American south drew from either a new south revitalization project or an old south revitalization project to shape a southern political culture. Past studies on the revitalization of the south have narrowly focused on the economic changes (e.g. industrialization, economic modernization) and concluded that changes in the southern economic infrastructure were responsible for sweeping changes to southern life (Wright 1986, Schulman 1991, Bartley 1995). Sale correctly noted how the southern "economic revolution that created the giant post-war industries of defense, aerospace, technology, electronics, agribusiness, and oil and gas extraction" (1975: 6) shifted the balance of political power and American population from the northeast to the south. The south disproportionately benefited from Federal policies and monies that established new technology industries, as well as a real estate boom (see Gottdiener 1994: 255–262). Southern states facilitated the flow of Federal and northern capital by restructuring their corporate tax rate, which from 1950 to 1978 went from 85% above the national average to 3% below the rest of the country (Wright 1986: 259). However, the economic focus overlooks how parts of the south, such as Birmingham, were already industrial manufacturing towns dating back to the turn of the 20th century, or how Fulton County and Atlanta, Georgia had a diversified economy, home to Delta Airlines, Coca Cola, and the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, Cobb (1999, 2005) has demonstrated how the "South" has served as a distinctive regional identity characterized by its adaptability and internal continuity rather than resistance to all change, and therefore, does not fit within a top-down modernization model characterized by the shift from a agrarian to an industrial economy. Indeed, we can find the distinctiveness of Southern culture materialized in bodies, place, memories and sense of belonging (Shelton 2007). To speak of a new south solely in economic terms misses the important cultural changes and discursive struggles that took place on how to redistribute political power from the rural county governments to the urban areas, how to embrace an embryonic post-industrial economy and, for this paper, the questions of policing racial inequality.

The new south revitalization project sought to produce a cosmopolitan civic image that distinguished southern locales from associations of intolerance and premodern social arrangements. For our purposes here, we can identify three general new south revitalization practices: 1) urban revitalization practices, 2) political and economic practices and 3) policing practices. Urban revitalization practices included developing modern architecture, paving roads

and installing water infrastructure (running water and plumbing) for all members of the county. The new southern revitalization project strengthened the municipal urban political power in order to balance out rural influence, by combining the multiple county power centers into a centralized government.[1] The economic practices were recruiting federal and northern investment of "new" technology (aluminum, aerospace and defense industries) to replace the northern controlled iron and steel plants, as well as the declining cotton and rice farming. Finally, and the focus of this paper, were policing practices that limited preemptive violence targeting blacks or labor activists, and cooperative policing practices between urban police chiefs, rural sheriffs, state police, and government officials (governors, mayors, common councils). The biggest challenge for the new south revitalization project was how to incorporate blacks into the new south without granting them equal rights. The subsequent payoff for limiting racial tensions and producing racial stability was the multi-billion dollar Federal subsidies.

The old south revitalization project rejected the idea that the south needed to or should produce new governing practices to attract Federal and Northern capital. The old south project drew from discourses of federalism (see Elazar 1987). They emphasized the idea that each southern state had political authority over its population and portrayed Federal intervention as part of a northern conspiracy to eradicate the southern way of life, especially in the form of federal rulings on civil rights legislation. The old south project originally developed in relation to the standpoint that New Deal policies represented federal encroachment on state's rights.[2] For example, Alabama, South Carolina, Arkansas, and Mississippi all developed legislative policy to avoid the 1944 Supreme Court *Smith v Allright* ruling that all white primaries were unconstitutional (Lawson 1976). Nor did southern states comply with the *Brown v Board of Education* ruling to desegregate schools. Former Mississippi Senator and White Citizens Council member James Eastland used discourses of the old south on the importance of resisting pro-civil rights legislation and the need to reproduce southern white autonomy: "As I view the matter . . . it is fundamental that each southern state must adopt a state policy and state program to retain segregation, and that all the power and resources of the state be dedicated to the end . . . The present conditions in which the south finds itself is more dangerous than reconstruction. It is more insidious than reconstruction."[3] Eastland's text represents how the old south revitalization project isolated the Federal Government and the North as the South's enemies while rejecting ideas that the south was so destitute it needed saving from itself.

In contrast to the new south revitalization project, the old south revitalization project rejected the idea that marginalizing and criminalizing the black population was a problem, and that the south should diversify from their manufacturing and agricultural economies. Instead, the old south revitalization project sought to strengthen the existing agricultural, iron, steal and coal businesses with tax breaks and patronage county and urban governments. In contrast to the new south idea of centralizing political authority, the old south favored patronage based governments, where individual bureaucrats hire and fire by personal friendships or political loyalty, which organized a "small" and "weak" government by employing professionals who were not qualified, had no expertise in the profession, and worked for less money. Unlike new south urbanization practices, the old south project did not invest resources into the physical environment. As I show below in the Birmingham case, Jefferson County's economic and political elites resided in exclusive towns and neighborhoods outside the city, and blocked the urban renewal efforts of the downtown merchants.

Albany and The New South Revitalization Project

The Albany Movement's origins are rooted in local reform organizations like the NAACP, which was staffed by local black teachers, preachers and business leaders (Carson 1994). However, in 1961 SNCC staffers Charles Sherrod and Cordell Reagan induced a cultural shift in the local black community when they began organizing around the nonviolent techniques learnt in Nashville and during the Freedom Rides. A key to SNCC's efficient organizing efforts was networking with the local groups, including churches, the NAACP, and the Negro Voters League, as opposed to competing with them. The Albany Movement organized around the objectives of desegregating all public facilities – civic and economic. The local movement organized the marches and demonstrations until frustration and the lack of any tangible gains caused by Pritchett's new south policing forced the Albany Movement to seek assistance from SCLC in July 1962.

Albany's administrators drew from the new south revitalization project to diversify a rural economy, based primarily on pecan and peanut farming, to attract new industries in defense, textile, candy, farm equipment and furniture manufacturing to southwest Georgia. It is within this new south governmentality that we should understand how Police Chief Laurie Pritchett created a new south style of policing. Unlike other southern cities, Albany had an existing centralized political structure that consisted of a mayor and city commission. Albany's governing groups were divided between the

police, municipal officials, and economic groups. Yet, Albany's existing political culture nurtured a working relationship between them based on the common objective of shaping an idealized new south image. This working relationship limited tensions and differences when Albany Mayor Asa Kelly and the City Commission negotiated with the Albany movement's leaders. Pritchett noted the City Commission objective was preserving Albany's trading, industrial and military image in southwest Georgia[4]. The question for Pritchett, therefore, was how to police the civil rights protests to prevent adverse effects on Albany's new south image that was opening flows of Northern and Federal capital.

   Pritchett's approach differed from previous old south police practices designed to defeat the civil rights movement. Pritchett and Kelly collected information and knowledge on nonviolent protests to familiarize themselves with the movement's strategy. Pritchett studied some of King's writings noting that, "I researched Dr. King. I read about his early days in Montgomery, his methods there. I read that he was a great follower of Gandhi's (Quoted in Raines 1983: 361). On the one hand, Pritchett identified what was different and unique about the current movement as opposed to homogenizing the black movement with all leftist social movements, especially labor. On the other hand, they recognized that recent civil rights protests exploited stereotypical southern violence, and therefore, managing police conduct became the major focus. Even before SCLC and King arrived in Albany, former SNCC member James Forman summed up Pritchett's approach: "Arrest quickly, quietly, and imprison. Move before white mobs can form, avoid brutal actions which can mobilize national support. Play it cool" (Forman 1972: 253). By familiarizing themselves with the epistemology and rationale behind the movement's strategy, Pritchett fashioned a police response designed to prevent civil rights protesters from exploiting the brutish southern stereotypes. While violence did not disappear, public violence was minimized.

   There were four dimensions of Pritchett's new south police practice: 1) surveillance 2) the non-threatening presentation of the police 3) the use of space to decentralize the movement, and 4) recoding blacks as "nationals". First, Pritchett relied on police surveillance to make efficient arrests rather than large-scale public arrests. Surveillance meant the ubiquitous monitoring of protest practice so that police could intervene prior to the protest escalating. For Pritchett, the problem with large-scale public arrests was the timing. Arresting after the protest assembled provided images for the media to capture on film. To illustrate, on 23 July 1962 Pritchett placed officers at and around the Shiloh Baptist Church to spy on a civil rights meeting. Because the police presence adversely

affected the crowd's emotions, creating tensions between blacks and the police, Pritchett removed the visible show of officers at 8 pm. After the meeting let out around 10 pm, Minister Vincent Harding led a small band of civil rights activists down the street, stopping in front of City Hall. Pritchett requested they leave at 11:05 pm. When the protesters refused, the police returned at 11:20 pm and arrested the protesters for failing to obey an officer and obstructing a sidewalk.[1] The police observed this procession over three hours, and it took them 15 minutes to arrest blacks on charges of loitering.

Second, Pritchett modified the presentation of the police. He instructed them to dress in standard police clothing, rather than riot gear, in order to limit the visual images of violence that produced adverse responses in black protesters and onlookers. Furthermore, he limited the use of state police, restricting the number of Georgia state troopers to 65, to minimize the symbolic presence of force and to maintain control over the demonstration. At one point during a protest, some black onlookers not affiliated with the movement threw bottles and rocks at the police. Pritchett's police did not respond with overt violence, thus, prompting praise for Albany's police force in northern newspapers.[5] By concentrating on the conduct of the police rather than protesters, Pritchett minimized violence and preserved Albany's new south civic image.

Third, Pritchett used space to create physical and symbolic distance between the protesters in order to control the temporal dimensions of the protest. He spread out the arrested activists to minimize communication lines between jailed protesters. Pritchett noted that they:

"Made preparations that at no time would any [protesters] be housed in our facilities in Albany or Dougherty County. I had made arrangements, and we had it on a map – Lee County, which was ten miles, and then we'd go out twenty-five miles, go out fifty miles, a hundred miles – and all these places had agreed to take the prisoners . . . We sent personnel along to see that they were not mistreated . . . stayed with'em in the jails to see that nobody in the other counties mistreated or mishandled'em" (quoted in Raines 1983: 361–362).

Pritchett's strategy of dispersing jailed protesters throughout the county forced the civil rights lawyers and allies to travel back and forth between jails, thus, placing a strain on the movement's resources and minimizing the potential to create social bonds between activists. Indeed, the movement planned for and used imprisonment to create solidarity by holding refresher courses and discussion groups on nonviolence (see Hohle 2009). Additionally,

[1] FBI 157-6-2-486 – 157-6-2-556.

Pritchett limited police violence when making mass arrests in front of key architectural and spatial locations, denying the civil rights movement a "backdrop" for their protest.[6] For instance, police made sweeping arrests of 250 marchers in the demonstration led by King on 16 December 1961 and arrested 75 visiting preachers while conducting a prayer vigil outside city hall on 28 August 1962 without a violent incident (FBI Folder 157-6-2-231 – 157-6-2-350). The efficient and non-violent arrests allowed the civil rights movement to demonstrate while preventing them from recoding local architecture into symbols of racial oppression.

The fourth new south police practice was reconceptualizing blacks as nationals rather than as marginalized and despised subjects. Unlike citizenship, which guarantees individuals rights and protection from an abusive state, the new south project recoded blacks as nationals, in that blacks may claim protection from the state without formal protection (i.e. rights). In part, we can understand designating blacks as nationals as part of the civil rights movement "liminal" moment towards citizenship rights as the South experimented with different forms and intensities of racial integration. We see this in how Pritchett approached the handling of Martin Luther King, symbolically the most important figure in the civil rights movement. King staged his arrest and subsequent imprisonment to signify the unfair treatment of southern blacks. Pritchett, aware of how King presence drew media attention, neutralized King's self-imprisonment strategy by ordering his release. Pritchett claimed an anonymous "well-dressed Negro male" posted bail. This created doubt about King's intentions, commitment and credibility in the black movement, especially with SNCC. King recalled his response after being notified of his release was, "Well Chief, we want to serve this time, we fell we owe it to ourselves and the seven-hundred and some-odd people of this community who still have these cases hanging over them." His [Pritchett] only response then was "God knows, Reverend, I don't want you in my jail." This was one time that I was out of jail and I was not happy to be out" (King 1998: 159). The handling of King as a political prisoner not subject to the types of abuses blacks typically faced in prison, along with ensuring no overt or excessive physical abuse for all imprisoned blacks, illustrated how the new south governmentality changed the expertise and functions of southern policing.

In sum, the new south revitalization project included an approach to policing southern blacks that facilitated subsequent changes in local southern economic, political and urbanization practices. The four dimensions of new south policing represented a break from previous southern police practices that sought to defeat a social movement by "destroying" it through violence and intimi-

dation. Unlike the Montgomery Movement and Freedom Rides, the outcome of the Albany Movement produced no national or local policy changes. Although the movement and civic leaders negotiated a settlement that required King to leave, local groups, including SNCC and the NAACP continued the Albany Movement's struggle for racial desegregation. However, the continuation of the local movement remained in the acceptable space reserved for civil rights protest thus ensuring no damage to Albany's new south civic image. Next, I will compare Albany's new south police practices with Birmingham's old south police practice to elaborate on the difference between managing the protest and trying to defeat the protest.

Birmingham and The Old South Revitalization Project

Similar to the Albany Movement, the Birmingham Movement predates the arrival of King and SCLC. Birmingham's blacks organized through the Rosewood Voters League and the local NAACP chapter until Alabama declared the NAACP a terrorist organization and outlawed it in 1956. Early protest activities included a legal suit against racial zoning laws and school desegregation (Thorton 2002: 160). After the NAACP was disbanded, local black leaders, including Fred Shuttlesworth, formed the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, and networked within SCLC's umbrella of local black churches (Morris 1984, Manis 1999). The Interracial Committee, headed by local white moderates and businessmen, notably Sydney Smyer, aided the Birmingham Movement and advised the city on matters of racial integration. Based on their perceived shortcomings in Albany and Birmingham's reputation for violence, SCLC came to Birmingham in 1963 to use the city as a test case for equal employment opportunities and desegregating municipal facilities.

Birmingham, located in Jefferson County Alabama, drew from the old south revitalization project. The political makeup of Birmingham differed from the working relations that bound Albany's political culture. The conflicts between Birmingham's political groups were embedded in the competing revitalization strategies. The "Big Mules", executives in the coal and iron industry, were the most influence group in Birmingham's civic affairs (Grafton and Permaloff 1985). Because the Big Mules resided in Mountain Brook, not the city of Birmingham, they were not concerned with urban decay, Birmingham's poor civic image, and blocked efforts to diversify and expand the service sector economy. Instead, they supported policies such as specialized tax breaks, and anti-union and pro-segregation stances designed to strengthen industrial

manufacturing. There were minimal tensions between labor and capital because the Klan, who were politically aligned with the Big Mules, used discourses of white supremacy to override class differences and established a firm white/black hierarchy (see Eskew 1997, Thorton 2002, McWhorter 2002).

The Big Mules faced no political challenges in Birmingham until a group representing the downtown service and retail sectors drew from the new south revitalization project to challenge the Big Mules for control of Birmingham's political affairs. The business group resented Birmingham's poor civic image and felt racial tensions were problematic for businesses.[7] Unlike the industrial sector, the city merchants directly profited from black consumption. However, while the power struggle between the downtown merchants and the Big Mules had an economic element, it was not economically determined. The business leaders' challenged the Big Mules over the control of city politics. They backed Connor's challenger, Albert Boutwell, who favored minimal desegregation without supporting equal rights.[8] Although Boutwell won the mayoral race, Connor challenged the election results in State Court, claiming the right to serve out his term that ended in 1965. The Alabama Supreme Court ruling, *Conner v Boutwell*, ruled in favor of Boutwell. Despite losing the mayoral election, the Big Mules and Governor Wallace continued to support and aid Connor, who resided over Birmingham's police response to the civil rights movement.

Despite being a key proponent of the old south revitalization project, Connor invited Pritchett to Birmingham for advisement on how to police the developing civil rights protests. Pritchett advised Connor to limit the presentation of violence and to protect King at all times. Recalling his meetings with Connor, Pritchett said:

"In Albany we had a bodyguard with him [King] at all times . . . We afforded him protection. This caused some criticism that we were payin' tax-payers money to protect this man, and I felt it was proper. As I told them, if this man was killed in Albany, Georgia, the fires would never cease – that if he were ever killed in any city that the fires would be there" (Quoted in Raines 1983: 365).

Connor was initially receptive to Pritchett's new south policing. Connor limited the amount of police violence, and by all accounts, the civil rights movement was having a difficult time building a sustained movement in Birmingham. Segregationist political and economic leaders, including Federal Judge Clarence Allgood, advised Connor on the merits of his continue restraint. Press reports questioned King's leadership, and two Alabama Council members called off negotiations with the movement. However, the logic of old south governmentality prevented Connor from continuing the application of new south police practices. The style and

manner in which the civil rights movement was defeated mattered more and had broader regional symbolic meanings than the just defeating the movement.

To understand why Connor reverted to violence, we have to look at how Jefferson County's "patronage system" produced quasi-cultural and political sovereignty for the county's political leaders, including the Big Mules. The Big Mules gained influence over Jefferson County's political culture by backing James Simpson as their local state representative in 1926. In 1935, Simpson helped pass civil service reform, also known as the "patronage system", designed to deregulate public civil service and make it possible to hire, fire and promote through patronage (Synder 1937, 1938). The patronage system applied only to Jefferson County, not to any other part of Alabama, and therefore, politically insulated Jefferson County from the rest of the state.[9] Thus, the problem of viewing Connor as a "rouge elite" who continued to used violent police practices for future gains despite getting rational advice not to, neglects an understanding of how an old south governmentality organized the patronage system. In municipal affairs, the patronage system created a political-juridical infrastructure loyal to Connor since he made decisions on whom to hire and promote. More importantly, the broader importance of the patronage system was it represented an idealized old south technique of insulating a ruling group from outside challenges by excluding rival political groups from administrative and public positions that would have given them even minor representation in the regional identity.

In contrast to Pritchett's new south police practices, we can contrast four dimensions of the old south's containment practices: 1) isolation 2) threatening presentation of the police 3) the use of space to segregate blacks and 4) the reproduction of blacks as criminal subjects. First, Connor isolated the civil rights protests within the black neighborhoods to prevent the protest from spreading throughout the city. Isolation practices become fixated on protecting and policing boundary lines as opposed to surveillance practices fixated on bodies. Connor erected physical boundaries – roadblocks and a white tank – to ensure blacks remained in the black neighborhoods. In part, the old south governmentality that organized Jefferson County patronage system limited Connor's capacity to execute broad surveillance. Two members of the police quit on instruction to limit violence and execute surveillance over the civil rights demonstrators and American Nazi party. Unlike surveillance practices, which observed protest practices as they unfolded and arrested efficiently, isolation practices produced "blind spots" that forced the police to act and arrest only after the protest was under way. Indeed, isolation practices worked to the

civil rights demonstrators' advantage because it produced "free spaces" for meetings, deliberation and pedagogy that created the movement's collective identity.

The second difference was in the presentation of the police. Whereas Pritchett fashioned police in standard issue police uniforms and limited the use of state police, Connor used police dogs, fire hoses, and fashioned police in riot gear topped with white World War 2 style helmets. The presentation of force created a public spectacle out of the arrests. The force of the water from the fire hoses knocked people down, ripped their clothes, and took the bark off trees. Dogs bit protesters and yanked at their clothing as police grabbed the protesters. In contrast to Albany, Birmingham's police presentation heightened affective responses and encouraged violence from blacks not involved in the movement. Rather than control the environment, the threatening police presence heightened emotional tensions, induced a riot, and prompted federal intervention to reestablish social order in Birmingham.

The third difference was in the use of space to control the temporal dimensions of the protest. In contrast to Pritchett's surveillance and jailing practices that dispersed the protesters throughout the county, Connor sought to contain civil rights marchers in the black neighborhoods and housed all arrested protesters in makeshift jails located within Birmingham's municipal boundaries. Connor contained blacks in the "black part" of town, at 16th street, and tried to keep them away from City Hall on 19th Street. Furthermore, Connor used his administrative authority to target the black population by cementing shut golf holes at public courses and closing public parks in the segregated black neighborhoods. This contrasted to Pritchett's practice of closing all public libraries and public pools, including those that served whites, for general security reasons. Spatial-containment practices allowed for the movement's most efficient use of the time-space dynamic. Reflecting on events during the movement, SCLC director Wyatt Tee Walker said, "I prayed that he'd keep trying to stop us . . . Birmingham would have been lost if Bull had let us go down to the City Hall and pray; if he'd had let us do that and stepped aside, what else would be new? There would be no movement, no publicly. But all he could see was stopping us before we got there" (Quoted in Garrow 1986: 251). Connor's containment practices of protecting boundaries provided specific points for protesters and the media to converge. Combined with the expectations of violence and constant police intervention whenever blacks congregated, Connor's old south policing allowed the movement to do more with less time and increased the movement's probability for success, despite the movement's difficulty in recruiting local black involvement.[10]

Lastly, rather than recoded blacks as nationals, Connor targeted influential movement leaders, especially Martin Luther King and Fred Shuttlesworth, and criminalized black youth involved in the protests.[11] First, the old south practice of targeting political leaders is tied to the logic that to stop a social movement or any challenge for power, those in power must "cut off the head" of movement by targeting political leaders, whose physical presence was considered necessary for a social movement's success. Therefore, by removing the social movement leader the police end the political threat or challenge. To illustrate, Connor's police directed physical violence toward Shuttlesworth, which sent him to the hospital (Garrow 1986: 255, Manis 1999: 378–379). Connor imprisoned King for a prolonged period, where King scripted the infamous "Letter From Birmingham Jail". This idea of targeting leaders contrasted to Pritchett's practices of preventing martyrdom, which targeted the population rather than individual protesters. Second, Connor criminalized the black protest by imprisoning black youth who participated in the marches. He jailed approximately 2425 students at the city's Boys Home and local 4-H Club (Eskew 1997: 275), including 25 children, ages 10–15, who marched down 19th street toward city hall while holding a banner that read "Love God and Thy Neighbor."[12] This differed from Pritchett's approach that used Albany's juridical apparatuses to lecture underage protesters on the undesirability of civic participation in social movements rather than jail them. The idea behind lecturing as a form of corrective practice recoded black political participation into youthful digression without criminalizing them, which in turn, delegitimized young people's civic practices as not as important as the adult protesters.

The outcome of the Birmingham Movement was laden with paradox and contradiction. The downtown merchants' decisions to support the desegregation of downtown stores paradoxically led to their decline. Consequently, racial integration on the economic level created more support for the new south project, which included suburbanization and the construction of the first shopping mall in Jefferson County, and had the unintended consequence of decentralizing the white population, ultimately undercutting the merchants' political power. Despite federal intervention, the old south revitalization project grew in popularity throughout the Alabama and the Deep South. 1963–1965 saw the spread of Wallace's pro-segregation platform, climaxing in the 1964 Alabama state elections, with Bull Connor elected to the position of State Public Service Commissioner. For blacks, the evaluation of the outcome depended on the local versus federal level. The federal government passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, yet, Birmingham's black residents did not immediately benefit from the federal civil rights policy.

Locally, "Operation New Birmingham" became an important inter-racial group that pushed for physical infrastructure and economic improvement, but whites controlled city politics and proceeded slowly with racial and civic integration (see Thorton 2002: 370–378).

Thus, the old south revitalization project represented an idea of how to produce southern cultural autonomy by defeating and eliminating adversaries and, subsequently, alternative revitalization projects. Despite advisement from Pritchett and political allies, Connor continued to use old south practices because the *style of winning* was more important than *actually winning*. The old south police practices of containment emphasized the policing of bound-aries, criminalizing black political practice, and using violence to defeat the movement. This differed from the new south revitalization project's police practices of managing the protest that limited inscribing power through bodily violence, which prevented the movement from creating symbolic meaning that resonated with the national American polity. Next, I will show how the old south and new south revitalization practices struggled for authority in Selma.

Selma and Competing Southern Revitalization Projects

Selma provides a case where both southern revitalization projects struggled on equal grounds for local and regional influence. The revitalization projects were embedded in the two different levels of government – the old south in the county and state level, and the new south in the municipal level. After Birmingham, southern locales increasingly became aware of how police violence and overt racial discrimination affected their national image. However, the question of what constituted a negative civic image still varied depending on revitalization project. On the one hand, Former Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett addressed a Mississippi White Citizens' Council meeting on the topic of Mississippi's civic image, noting, "There are a lot of people who have been talking about the need to improve the image of Mississippi. But let me ask you people here . . . is there anything wrong with Mississippi's image? No."[13] In contrast, the Selma based Dallas County White Citizens' Council placed an ad in the Selma-Times Journal to recruit members around the idea that the Citizens' Council could prevent the civil rights movement from polluting the new south project. Rhetorically, the ad stated, "Ask your self this important question: what have I personally done to maintain segregation? Is it worth four dollars to prevent a "Birmingham" here? "Is it worth four dollars to you to prevent sit-ins, mob marches and wholesale Negro voter registra-tion in Selma?"[14] The Selma Citizens' Council appealed to whites to

support the new south revitalization project based on its potential to create a cultural system that could maintain racial segregation and economically revitalize the city.

The Selma movement traces its origins to the NAACP's effort to fight the "Fisk Trials", and voter registration groups like the Dallas County Voter's League (see Thorton 2002: 391). In concert with the Dallas County Voter's League, SNCC began organizing Selma's black population and mapping the local community's birth, death, and infant mortality rates in 1963.[15] SNCC held meetings, led demonstrations, and networked with local high school students to produce a foundational network. Based on the foundation established by SNCC, SCLC arrived in 1965 to launch a voting rights campaign. SCLC selected Selma primarily because they predicted Dallas County Sherriff Jim Clark would organize a police response the same way Connor did, and thus, ensure a federal response.

When SCLC arrived in 1965, the city of Selma was in the midst of using the new south revitalization project to diversify their economy and modernize their political structure, and thus, began to implement new south practices into their municipal apparatuses, including the police. For example, the Selma Dallas County Chamber of Commerce, published a pamphlet in 1965 titled "Selma Alabama: The "Old and 'New' South" that attempted to associate the area with a new south civic image.[16] The idea behind the pamphlet was to "market" a modern and progressive image of Selma. The pamphlet shows off the architectural heritage of Selma alongside new monuments, including an air force base and the upscale Hotel Albert. Although Selma remained a desolate and racially segregated city by all accounts, they nevertheless produced texts and materials designed to produce a prospective and possible future idealized Selma.[17] The pamphlet sought to distinguish Selma from stereotypes of the south as suffering from poor and dysfunctional governing. Under the picture of the courthouse, the text reads, "A rare characteristic is found in Selma in the exemplary cooperation existing between our city and county governments."[18] The point of a harmonious and stable local governing structure distinguished Selma from old south divisions between political and economic elites, such as in Birmingham, to signify no government interference with day-to-day business practices.

Selma used marketing and public relations as part of their policing practice to prepare for a large-scale, drawn-out movement like in Birmingham. The Dallas County Chamber of Commerce produced and distributed 100,000 copies of a booklet titled "The Story of Selma or "The Other Side of the Coin."[19] David Lawrence wrote the main editorial titled "The Wrong Way", which associated Dallas County with the side of democratic order. He argued: "We pride

ourselves on a belief in democracy – on the exercise of a rule of reason in our national life . . . We have rejected mobocracy as the manifestation of anger, of bitterness, and of unwilling to let the rule of reason and the process of law prevail."[20] Furthermore, he accused King of provoking violence: "The race question will never be solved with a policeman's club anymore than by 'sit-ins' or other incitements to disorder and mob violence."[21] Lawrence sought to silence the debate over racial equality by switching the topic to the presence of violence. Focusing on the presences of violence simultaneously distinguished new south whites from blacks and old south whites, and linked police violence with non-violent methods to discredit both. By making the debate over the presence, not cause of, violence, he created a method for discrediting blacks' claims for equality without acknowledging the claim. Additionally, the booklet sought to harden racial boundaries by emphasizing southern beliefs against interracial sex practices to establish limits of white support of the movement. The booklet drew on past and existing fears of impure bloodlines, which also implied a degenerate future southern society. For example, the booklet reprinted a speech by William Dickson,[22] where he associated the interracial sex acts with other bodily functions of public drunkenness and public urination.

The Case of the Hammermill Paper Company represents how the competing revitalization projects and civil rights movement were enmeshed in the circuits of southern revitalization. The Hammermill Paper Company was looking to expand their paper making operations. On the state level, Governor George Wallace recruited the Hammermill Paper Company to Selma by exempting Hammermill from state and local taxes and using public tax money to finance the construction of "inland docks, improved highways, and a new bridge to ease traffic through the area."[23] Wallace followed the old south revitalization project of offering economic incentives, coupled with implicit anti-union and anti-racial practices, to attract industry based on minimizing labor costs and overhead. Selma, however, drew from the new south project to recruit Hammermill based on an idea of Selma's political stability and developing cultural diversity. Donald Leslie, Hammermill Chairman of the Board of Directors, used new south discourses in proclaiming his company's decision to locate to Selma because of "the character of the community and its people."[24]

Rather than boycott Hammermill based on the principles of racial segregation, SNCC organized a boycott of Hammermill that targeted the revitalization projects. SNCC felt that both revitalization projects supported southern elites at the expense of Alabama's black and white poor citizens. SNCC attempted to spread the

boycott to northern cities, and urged student groups to pressure their college administrators to cancel all Hammermill accounts.[25] In March of 1965, John Lewis of SNCC and the Hammermill Company exchanged correspondence. Hammermill used discourses of the new south to assure Lewis that,

"We share your concern that the basic rights of Negroes in Alabama have been denied and even more particularly in the Selma community. Particularly, we deplore the violence which has permeated the area. We have publicly stated to Governor Wallace and his staff and to a large group of citizens of the Selma area that Hammermill traditional policies are built on the principles of respect for the rights of others and the maintenance of law and order . . . The mill which is now being designed will not have separate facilities for white and colored employees."[26]

Hammermill argued the boycotts and demonstrations were unnecessary because of Hammermill's commitment to nonviolent police practices, juridical equality, and respect for black civil rights. Lewis rejected Hammermill's sincerity, and responded that SNCC would continue efforts to block the construction of a new plant, in part, because "the moneys which would build your plant were in part collected from people who have no say in their dispositions. And the funds which the agreement follows you to keep from the tax revenues could be better used for community improvement."[27] However, in the public literature announcing the Hammermill boycott, SNCC questioned and denounced the new south revitalization project: "Several things suggest that if Hammermill does come to Selma its presence will not improve its 'corporate image' "[28]. For SNCC, the "real" Selma was represented by Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark's 200 man posse, and State Police Captain Al Lingo's anti-black State Patrol that were always ready to "take action."[29] Despite Selma's efforts to shape a new south civic image, SNCC engaged the discursive battle to define the "real" Selma, and conversely the "real" South, against a developing idea that a "new south" was rising.

When SCLC arrived in Selma to promote the need for additional voter protection rights, Selma and Dallas County officials modified their policing practice. Prior to the arrival of SCLC, the response to the civil rights protesters varied by police jurisdiction – where violence and intimidation was commonplace in the rural areas, and less so in the city. Because of the national media attention that accompanied King and the ongoing non-violent demonstrations, SCLC was in a better position to transform local forms of violence and intimidation into a national referendum. The municipal Selma officials, specifically public safety director Wilson Baker and Mayor Joseph Smitherman, drew from the new south police model. Although Baker was not a native Selma resident, he did have the

backing of Selma's "moderate" white political culture that sup-
ported the new south project (see Fager 1974). In contrast to
Connor, who sought advisement from a fellow southern sheriff,
Baker and Smitherman requested the advisement of the US Justice
Department's Community Relations Service (CRS), headed by
Burke Marshall. Robert Kennedy originally sent Burke Marshall to
Albany to study civil right protest strategy and develop subsequent
police practice to stop it.[30] The CRS functioned as a quasi-federal
agency that consulted rather than took control of local areas. In
essence, CRS based their advice on Pritchett's new south police
model designed to neutralize the civil rights movement capability to
create a national response. CRS sent advisors Andrew Seacrest and
Kenneth Moreland to Selma. Seacrest noted, "If CRS seeks to help
Selma make steady progress in complying with the Civil Rights Act
and to avoid lawsuits, violence and arrests, this may run counter to
Dr. King's objective of creating a kind of confrontation which will
lead him to Montgomery and Governor Wallace (Quoted in Garrow
1986: 378). Baker adopted the CRS model of new south police
practices to counter Sheriff Jim Clark's old south practices.

In contrast to Baker, Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark and
Alabama Director of Public Safety and head of the State Police Al
Lingo drew from the old south project. Locally, Baker and Clark
were involved in a "turf war", in that both claimed to have police
jurisdiction over the city of Selma. Clark's support was rooted in
rural Dallas County. Former Alabama governor James "Big Jim"
Folsom appointed Clark to the position of Sheriff as a political favor
for managing his Dallas County political campaign. However,
Folsom lost political influence, and his political career, because of
his support for the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and his meeting with
Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell (Grafton and Permaloff
1985, Sims 1985). Lingo, on the other hand, reported directly to
Wallace. Just like Connor, Clark and Lingo rejected CRS advice on
using new south police practices. Similar to Connor, Clark initially
sought to limit the use of violent police practices once SCLC arrived.
When SNCC began organizing local blacks in 1963, they noted how
Clark organized and deputized a posse, of 300 to 500 men "dressed
in old army fatigues, and armed with pistols, rifles and shotguns"
in addition to the existing police force.[31] Also similar to Connor,
Clark's restraint did not last long even though his initial calm
demeanor prompted SCLC to explore alternative locales.[32] However,
the logic of old south governmentality rooted in rural Dallas County
coupled with additional coercion from the State to amend past
defeats ensured the application of a violent police response.

The struggle over the style in which the police "defeated" the civil
rights movement not only pitted Baker versus Clark, but Selma

against the rest of Dallas County and the state of Alabama. The struggle created contradictory police tactics implemented simultaneously during the demonstrations. Baker used new south practices, especially the ideas of surveillance and managing the temporal dimensions of the protest. He instructed civil rights protesters to line up in groups of two or three, with space between each group, on the sidewalk, to slow down the pace of the march to the courthouse. During the same demonstration, Clark stationed himself in front of the courthouse, forcing black protesters to line up in the alley behind the courthouse and enter one at a time through the back door. Once contained in the alley, Clark began harassing and arresting blacks. Wallace ordered the state police, led by Lingo, to intervene in the demonstration despite Baker's success at minimizing violence and tensions between the police and black protesters. When protesters attempted to cross the Pettus Bridge on their first march from Selma to Montgomery, Clark and Lingo responded with police (and posse members) armed with tear gas, electric cattle prods, batons, and some on horse back. The violent spectacle became known as "Bloody Sunday" because of the amount and intensity of police violence captured on film and broadcast over network television. During the violence, Baker sought to get blacks to "safety" in the church, where he told leaders that the state troopers "just took it out of their hands."[33] The following day, state police constructed a border by the church. In this case, they strung a clothesline across the street in the black ghetto 200 yards from the chapel, and blocked the road leading from the church to the courthouse, to contain blacks at the church. Baker, however, proceeded to cut the down clothesline, which had become a new symbol and location of protest, and allowed blacks to march to the courthouse in a symbolic gesture of "opening up" Selma to blacks. Indeed, violence was not reserved only for black civil rights activists. After Bloody Sunday, a white minister, James Reeb, was killed by a mob of whites after leaving a local diner. Violet Liuzzo, a white woman from Michigan volunteering in Selma, was killed by a white mob while driving a young black civil rights worker back to Montgomery. The deaths of the white activists induced a stronger federal response than deaths of any of the black activists, a point not lost on SNCC.[34]

The outcome of the Selma Movement signaled a decisive point for the South and the civil rights movement. Civil rights scholars have noted that Selma was the climax and the beginning of the end for the movement. SCLC became wed to the tactics they perfected in Birmingham and Selma, although with limited results in North, which caused many blacks to seek alternatives forms of political struggle. SNCC began to adopt black nationalist practices and

concentrated on organizing urban ghettos and establishing rural co-opts. Selma's moderate whites, led by the Merchant Association, institutionalized the new south revitalization project, with its emphasis on acceptable levels of racial segregation in local governing affairs. Rather than fight for the legal right to racially segregate, Selma set up a series of private schools through the 1965 "Freedom Choice Plan", hence, bifurcating the white and black school population into private and public education (see Thorton 2002). Rather than a decisive end to the old south project, it folded into the new south revitalization project, and thus, supported a new form of idealized southern community distinct from the North.[35] A year after the Selma Movement, Shirley Mesher, the project director of the Dallas County Voters League, wrote noted in a church pamphlet asking for donations, "What was behind the need for the vote – oppression and a never ending cycle of poverty – remains . . . And the vote is meaningless unless people have a choice".[36]

Thus, the Selma case illustrates how local and state levels drew from different projects. At the local level, Selma was more concerned with managing the protest to prevent police-racial violence that would damage their desired new south image. In contrast, Dallas County and the State of Alabama were more concerned with advancing the old south project throughout the state and regional levels for immediate and future political influence. After Selma, in the North and South, responses to subsequent civil rights and anti-war protests were organized around limiting violence and the use of surveillance rather than using various means to contain protests. However, slippages and openings developed in the West and the North, notably in Berkeley, Chicago, and at Kent State, which highlights the enduring and alluring idea of defeating and eliminating political adversaries and threats. For contemporary social movements, it is the possibility of future slippages, such as in Seattle in 1999, that social movements can produce national and international symbolic meaning.

Conclusion

In an effort to limit future violent police practices of 1960's Alabama, Alabama created the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission in 1971 to regulate the quality of Alabama law enforcement.[37] This piece of legislation highlights the hybrid old south/new south governing assemblage that took shape after the Selma Movement, starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Local municipalities, including Birmingham, began enforcing desegregation laws, especially in retail and service sector businesses. Yet, the old south revitalization project continued to shape

the governing practices of southern states organized by overt and implicit racial hostility, the reduction of corporate taxes, and the continued use of political patronage. It is not by accident that the two competing revitalization projects were able develop a hybrid form of governing based on the new south idea of security that permitted a minimal level of racial and civic integration, since neither project sought racial equality. Although the old south solution to the race problem was no longer effective, it gained strength and political support from defeat in rural areas, paving the way for the "Dixiecrat" challenge and the merger/political alliance between old south political culture and the national Republican Party (see Black and Black 2002). Yet, in the circular logic of southern revitalization, local municipalities benefited from lower corporate tax rates and state monies to relocate capital to their areas. As the above example of the Hammermill Paper Company illustrates, Northern companies wanted lower tax rates and corporate subsidies, *as well as* racial and political stability nurtured by local new south projects.

The analysis of competing southern revitalization projects and police practices provides new ways of thinking about 1) the continued used of violence and containment practices after 1961 and 2) the role of the American federal government in providing political opportunities to the civil rights movement. Despite the existence and knowledge of the new south policing that neutralized civil rights protests, Birmingham and Dallas County continued to use the unsuccessful containment practices. While at first it this appears as the result of rouge elites, historical evidence links the containment practices to the larger old south governmentality. Alabama's embryonic neoliberal political culture linked Simpson, the Big Mules, Connor, Wallace, Lingo, Clark etc. to a singular old south governmentality, conjoined by future representations of an idealized old south based on industrial manufacturing, an agricultural economy, and the physical exclusion of blacks. Although Birmingham and Dallas County attempted to modify their policing practices when SCLC, and more importantly King, was present, the attempt at reform was short lived. In part, old south police techniques had less to do with stopping the civil rights movement than it did with strengthening and expanding its regional political influence.

Second, this paper provided a conceptual framework that questioned the extent that political opportunities only "open" at the state, economic or political party level. The empirical evidence suggests, in the case of the civil rights movement, the competing political projects, which transversed local, state and county political cultures, were more a causal factor than political or economic

structures in producing movement outcomes. While variations in local responses were important on each outcome, local responses were embedded in either new south or old south ideals. Indeed, despite Johnson's rhetoric of support for the civil rights movements' goals, the federal government's response was contradictory and uneven. They developed quasi-federal agencies like the CRS to advise local authorities on how to stop the movement while simultaneously pushing for expanding protective legislation. The paradox of federal intervention was that it worked for all competing interests, albeit for different reasons. The civil rights movement wanted the federal government to enforce laws and produce new citizenship rights because the local states would not. Federal intervention produced space for new south practitioners to assume control of local governing institutions and embed new south ideas into local governing practices. Finally, the old south project used federal intervention as evidence of the need to preserve a distinct southern political culture from future encroachments and the importance of securing regional influence.

Notes

[1] The new south revitalization project sought to central political structures that varied from mayor and common council headed some city governments to a mayor, public commissioner, and common council ran others. Additionally, the rural county governments had more influence over state politics than urban areas. For instance, Georgia's political structure, dubbed the "county unit system" gave the urban areas just 12% of the unit votes, thus placing political control of the state in the hands of county governments (Schulman 1991: 121). In 1946, Herman Tallmadge was elected governor despite losing the popular vote to James Carmichael. The Tallmadge administration was responsible for shaping pro-segregation policy, such voter tests to be taken every two years, sodomy laws, and forcing hospitals to store black blood separately from white blood (see Tuck 2001: 74–80).

[2] Examples of mid-1930s Alabama new deal polices were minimum fund programs that required using local school taxes for the schools, and anti-prohibition laws that established liquor licenses on the condition that the local county receives 20% of all net profits (Snyder 1937, 1938).

[3] "SNCC Pamphlet/Booklet: "Mississippi: Subversion of the right to vote" located in RS 1–10.

[4] See New York Times 16 August 1962.

[5] See New York Times 1 August 1962.

[6] Juergensmeyer (2001) has documented the importance of terror groups use buildings as backdrops for their actions in order to demonstrate the weakness of a dominant group. While the civil rights movement was far from a terror organization, they did stage their demonstrations at architecture and places.

[7] On the downtown's merchants concern for the Klan negative impact on Birmingham and competition with Atlanta for the South's "great metropolitan center" see Thorton 165–166.

⁸ Boutwell gained political influence for passing the "freedom of choice" bill in the Alabama state senate, allowing the use of public money to fund private schools, in an effort to let parents choose to send their children to either segregated or desegregated schools (see Sims 1985: 183).

⁹ Despite court challenges, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the use of the patronage system in *Yelding v Alabama 1936*.

¹⁰ The difficultly in recruiting local blacks coupled with Connor's predictable violent response prompted Wyatt Walker to recruit teenagers and young children for the marches (see Garrow 1986: 264).

¹¹ Shuttlesworth was a long time Birmingham black civil rights activist noted for his courage because he did not fear Connor or Birmingham's whites (see Manis 1999).

¹² NYT 5 May 1963.

¹³ Quoted in "SNCC Special Report: Mississippi Image and Reality. March 1965" located in SAV 47-5.

¹⁴ "Flyer to Join Citizens Council – Dallas County from 1963" located in SAV 46-2.

¹⁵ "Special Report from Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Selma, Alabama (September 26, 1962)" located in RF 1-1.

¹⁶ "Selma Alabama: The 'Old' and 'New' South. Pamphlet published by the by Selma and Dallas County Chamber of Commerce" located in CC 1-8.

¹⁷ See Zinn [1965] 2002 for his first person accounts, as well as the SNCC publication "Special Report: Selma Alabama" 26 September 1963" located in SAV 48-2.

¹⁸ "Selma Alabama: The 'Old' and 'New' South. Pamphlet published by the by Selma and Dallas County Chamber of Commerce" located in CC 1-8.

¹⁹ "The Story of Selma or "The Other Side of the Coin" distributed by the Selma and Dallas County Chamber of Commerce. Copyright 1965 located in CC 1-8.

²⁰ IBID.

²¹ IBID.

²² In addition to the reprint in the Selma booklet, Dickson sent out 15,000 copies of this speech, and his key points were published in a *Time* Article titled "New Republic 'A Walk in Alabama' " on May 7 1965.

²³ See "Memo to friends of SNCC Re: Hammermill Paper Company" located in SAV 46-2.

²⁴ IBID.

²⁵ See "Press Release: SNCC says don't buy Hammermill" located in SAV 48-2 and "Memo to friends of SNCC Re: Hammermill Paper Company" located in 46-2.

²⁶ "Letter to John Lewis from Hammermill Paper Company 12 March 1965" located in RS 1-11).

²⁷ "Lewis Reply to Hammermill" located in RS 1-11.

²⁸ "Literature: Hammermill Boycott (31 March 1965)" located in RS 1-11.

²⁹ See "Literature: Hammermill Boycott (31 March 1965)" located in RS 1-11.

³⁰ NYT 15 July 1962.

³¹ See SNCC press release "90 Negroes Arrested in Selma, Alabama Protest Demonstration. Special White Posse Formed." Located in SAV 48-2.

³² Clark famously snapped at Annie Lee Cooper, who publicly berated him for his prior racial violence, and proceeded to drag her down a block, marking a distinct and decisive return to violence.

³³ "COFO news – notes from Selma" located in SAV 48-13.

[34] On how the different federal and national response to the Reeb and Liuzzo killings affected SNCC, see Carson 1994: 161

[35] At this point, I concur with Cobb (2005) on two points. That South continues to serve as distinct regional identity and that southern change based on an internal continuity.

[36] "Church Service Pamphlet" located in CC 1-7.

[37] See "Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission 2000".

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